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The Alien Tort Statute and Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Company: The Key to Change
in Global Child Labor Practices?
JESSICA BERGMAN*
ABSTRACT

The case of Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company involves

child laborers' claims that labor practices on a Liberian rubber
plantation violate international norms. Though the case was recently
resolved in favor of the defendants at the district court level, the case's
complicated procedural and substantive history offers insight into the
viability of future child labor claims. This Note examines the Flomo case
and explores how standards from the ATS and the United States
Supreme Court case Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain apply to future plaintiffs'
claims. This Note also analyzes the potential repercussions that plaintiffs
face in using the ATS as a tool to influence global child labor practices
and highlights the realities of ATS child labor litigation.
INTRODUCTION

There are 218 million child laborers in the world, and many of them
face exploitative conditions that place their welfare at risk.' With trade
* Executive Symposium Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D.
Candidate, 2011, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2008, University of
Kansas. I would like to thank Alfred Aman, Jr., Michael Grossberg, and Christiana Ochoa,
Professors of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, for their guidance and
comments on prior drafts of this Note.
1. Numbers are based on the International Labour Organization's (ILO) most recent global
estimate of child laborers ages five to seventeen around the world. "[Tlhe highest proportion of
child laborers (69%) work in the agriculture sector, followed by the services sector (22%) and the
industrial sector (9 %).In agriculture, children work in subsistence farming, small- to mediumsized family farms, and large-scale commercial plantations. No matter the size of the farm,
children working in agriculture often face a myriad of health and safety risks. They commonly
perform physically demanding tasks under harsh environmental conditions, often for long hours
with little rest. Some children working in agriculture are required to apply or are exposed to
pesticides and herbicides without adequate protective gear." U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. BUREAU OF INT'L
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becoming more liberalized, corporations are racing to produce goods
quicker and cheaper than their competitors, which has exacerbated
2
human rights problems for workers in developing countries. Because
developing countries are often unwilling or unable to implement child
labor laws within their borders, employers of children must be regulated
by outside entities for any recognized international norms to be
effectuated.3 The United States, as a global power, is currently in a
position to recognize internationally recognized standards of conduct
regarding labor. 4 Recent judicial developments regarding the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) 5-a U.S. jurisdictional statute-allow private parties to
bring suit against U.S. corporations that engage in some of the "worst
forms of child labor"6 abroad. Because a court can examine U.S.
interests and tailor a remedy accordingly, the ATS alleviates many of
the issues that prevent Congress from allowing causes of action under
LAB. AFF., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S 2008 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR,
at xxii (2008) (citing Int'l Lab. Org. recent estimates) (footnote omitted), available at
httpJ/www.dol.gov/ilab/programslocft/PDF/20080CFTreport.pdf. See generally Federico Blanco
Allais & Frank Hagemann, Child labour and education- Evidence from SIMPOC surveys, (Int'l
Lab. Org., Working Paper, June 2008) (discussing the effect of child labor on education),
availableat http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productld=8390.

2. Grace C. Spencer, Her Body is a Battlefield: The Applicability of the Alien Tort
Statute to CorporateHuman Rights Abuses in Juarez,Mexico, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 503, 50304 (2004) (discussing the effects that "compassionate capitalism" has on female workers'
human rights in Juarez, Mexico).
3. What constitutes an international norm, at least for the purposes of a court
allowing a private claim for a violation of such norm to proceed in a U.S. federal court, is
determined by whether a particular violation has reached the status of customary law. See
generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004) (reversing the availability of
remedies for the alien under FCTA and the ATS).

4. Justin D. Cummins, Invigorating Labor:A Human Rights Approach in the United
States, 19 EMORY IN'L L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010).
6. The worst forms of labor are defined in the ILO Convention 182 as "(a) all forms of
slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt
bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a
child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the
production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international treaties; (d)
work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm
the health, safety, or morals of children." International Labour Organization, Convention
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour, art. 3, adopted June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207 [hereinafter Convention on
Worst Forms of Child Labour]. The Convention is utilized for definitional purposes in this
paper because it is "the key source of international child labor standards" for the purposes
of Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2007), the case which
allowed the child laborers' claims to proceed in the district court and the subject of this
paper.
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child labor treaties.7 United States corporations are changing their child
labor policies in reaction to cases involving the ATS.
One such case is Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company,8
which was recently decided in favor of the defendants in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.9 The plaintiffs in the
7. Congress has not yet ratified a treaty that would create a cause of action by child
laborers. Thus, any cause of action must be judicially created, if children are to be able to
seek redress against corporations operating abroad. The ATS allows courts to hear child
laborers' claims that a violation of an international norm has occurred. See generally Anna

A. Kornikova, Note, InternationalChild Labor Regulation 101: What CorporationsNeed to
Know About Treaties Pertainingto Working Youth, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 207, 219-24
(2008) (discussing the existing international treaties that pertain to child labor and how
none create a cause of action).
8. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., No. 06-cv-00627 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2010).
The caption has changed during the litigation. After summary judgment was granted in
favor of all of the remaining defendants with the exception of Firestone Natural Rubber
Company, the case became Flomo v. FirestoneNatural Rubber Company. Entry Following
Oral Argument at 1, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 585); see also Notice of Caption Change
at 1, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 203). The relationship of the parties originally included
in the complaint is complex. Bridgestone Corporation wholly-owns Firestone Natural
Rubber Company as a subsidiary. Firestone Natural Rubber Company owns BFS
Diversified Products, LLC as a subsidiary. Firestone National Rubber Company, LLC
(FSNR) is a "division" of BFS Diversified Products, LLC. Firestone Liberia, previously the
Firestone Plantation Company, is a Liberian subsidiary of FSNR. 492 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
According to plaintiffs, FSNR "owns, controls, and directs Firestone's Liberia plantation."
Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Briefs in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims for Punitive Damages (Dkt. 495-1) and Plaintiffs'
Secondary Liability Theories (Dkt. 496-1) at 1, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 530)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion on Punitive
Damages]. The plaintiffs originally sued Firestone Liberia under the name of the
Firestone Plantation Company, but Firestone Plantation Company was dismissed from
the suit because it was not served. Order on Motion to Dismiss Unserved Defendants at 1,
Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 69). In a recent response to defendant's summary judgment
motion, plaintiffs limited their theory of liability to FSNR as the entity directly legally
responsible for plaintiffs' claims and the court granted summary judgment in favor of all
other defendants, dismissing them from the litigation. FSNR was the sole defendant
remaining in the final stages. Entry Following Oral Argument at 1, Flomo, No. 06-cv00627 (No. 585); Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Briefs in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims for Punitive Damages (Dkt. 495-1)
and Plaintiffs' Secondary Liability Theories (Dkt. 496-1), supra, at 2 n.3.
9. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., No. 06-cv-00627 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2010)
(issuing summary judgment in favor of defendant because no corporate liability exists
under the ATS and relying heavily on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19382 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010)). See generally

Gregory T. Euteneier, Comment, Towards a Corporate 'Law of Nations" Multinational
Enterprises' Contributionsto Customary International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 757 (2007)
(discussing mechanisms by which multinational corporations could be held civilly liable
under the ATS for a violation of an international norm); Chim&ne I. Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008) (exploring the
different circuits' approaches to corporate liability in cases under the ATS.
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case, a group of Liberian children, alleged that they were forced to
perform hazardous labor-in violation of international norms-on the
defendant's rubber plantation.10 The court originally held that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the
ATS11 and allowed them to go forward. 12 Flomo is the first case in which
a plaintiffs claims have survived the ATS jurisdictional bar and the
pleading stage. As a result, the case offers many useful procedural and
substantive lessons for litigating future child labor claims. 13 This paper
adds to the debate regarding the ATS by examining the Flomo case indepth and exploring the various obstacles that future plaintiffs will
encounter in bringing similar suits.14
Though globalization is frequently viewed from a top-down
perspective, this paper examines globalization from the bottom-up,
specifically how domestic law and private action can influence global
markets and institutions.' 5 While past international regulatory
mechanisms have failed to effectively regulate child labor, in part due to
the difficulties in defining child labor, private parties may, be able to

10. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
11. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010). The litigation lasted almost five years;
the initial complaint was filed on November 17, 2005. See Complaint, Flomo, No. 06-cv00627 (No. 2).
12. See Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-23 (denying defendant's motion for
dismissal).
13. See Complaint, supra note 11, at paras. 94-99. The court originally intended to
define the types of child labor in this case when ruling on the parties' motions for
summary judgment. Order at 3, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 569) (discussing original
order that stated, in ruling on parties' summary judgment motion, the court "would define
'worst forms' of child labor in the context of this case"). That ruling never occurred as
planned, and the litigation proceeded without clear definitional boundaries as to what
child labor is in the context of this case. However, because the court originally stated in its
opinion denying dismissal on plaintiffs' claims of forced child labor that the ILO is the
"key source" of child labor standards for the purpose of this case, the ILO is primarily
utilized in this paper. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
14. It is important to recognize that this paper is not about enforcing an international
norm against all forms of child labor, in large part, because it is far from clear that an
international norm exists for a ban on all forms of child labor, even within the United
States. See generally Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22 (discussing the various
forms of child labor allowed in the United States, such as on family farms, and the
difficulties determining which prohibitions on child labor have reached the status of an
international norm).
15. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalizationfrom the Ground up: a Domestic Perspective,
in THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND GOVERNANCE 2, 3-4

(Beverly Crawford ed., 2008) (describing the bottom-up perspective to globalization); see
also SASIA S ASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 45-47 (Jeffrey C. Alexander ed.,
2007) (describing scholarship on three basic positions on the state and globalization, and
adding a fourth).
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16
effectively regulate child labor practices through the judicial process.
This Note emphasizes that domestic actors, specifically courts and
private parties such as those that were involved in the Flomo case, are
impacting global practices. Specifically, in this case, fear of litigation
from multiple suits-brought on behalf of child laborers seeking redress
in a U.S. court for past harm-may cause corporations to slowly change
their labor regulations.' 7 In fact, because of the repeated litigation of
similar plaintiffs' claims, corporations are already aware of the potential
for litigation under the ATS.
To show how private parties can use the ATS to influence global
child labor practices, this Note examines the Flomo case and explores
how standards from the ATS and a prior Supreme Court case, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machair,1s apply to future plaintiffs' claims. This Note also
reviews the potential repercussions that plaintiffs may face in using the
ATS as a regulatory tool and highlights the realities of ATS child labor
litigation. Section I provides a brief overview of the ATS and the
Supreme Court decision interpreting it. Section II discusses the need for
a redress for child laborers in a globalized world and argues that the
ATS may provide such redress. Section III examines the Flomo case,
following the Supreme Court's recently articulated framework for ATS
claims,' 9 to determine which sources of law could be used to support an
international child labor norm. Section III also reviews the practical and
legal obstacles that plaintiffs faced in this case and provides risk
management guidance for future litigants bringing similar claims.

16. See SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 308-09 (2006) (arguing that it is possible to "engage the global from within
the national and through national institutional channels"). But see Archon Fung, Dara
O'Rourke, & Charles Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards, in CAN WE PUT AN END TO
SWEATSHOPS? 3, 3-40 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001) (arguing one way to
achieve effective labor regulation is through transnational organizations such as the ILO,
the United Nations, or the World Bank, but also cautioning that any effective strategy
must consider a country's individual economic circumstances).
17. This change exemplifies the bottom-up approach, in which the state is not just
influenced by globalization but the state also influences the globalization process. See
generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The GlobalizingState: A Future-OrientedPerspectiveon the
Public/PrivateDistinction, Federalism and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769,
773 (1998).
18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (interpreting the ATS and
articulating the standard for determining when a private cause of action should be
recognized under federal common law for violations of the law of nations).
19. Id. at 731-35.
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I. THE SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN FRAMEWORK FOR CLAIMS UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE

Pursuant to the ATS, federal courts have "original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."20 The Act, however, does
not create a cause of action. It only gives the federal courts subjectmatter jurisdiction over a "relatively modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations" that are recognized at common law. 21 In
the landmark decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court
articulated the standard for determining whether to recognize a private
claim under federal common law for violations of international legal
norms. 22 Though the Court stated it was leaving the judicial door ajar to
allow private claims, it noted that the door was "subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms." 23
In Sosa, the plaintiff, a Mexican national, sued the United States,
various U.S. federal agents, and a Mexican collaborator, alleging that he
was unlawfully abducted from Mexico, taken to the United States, and
arrested. 24 Citing the ATS, the plaintiff sought damages against
defendants, including the United States, and argued that the arrest had
taken place in violation of the law of nations. 25 The district court
awarded summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding (1) that the ATS
created a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations,
and (2) that there was a clear and universally recognized norm
prohibiting such an arrest. 26 However, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit's decision and held that the ATS was a jurisdictional

20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010). The history of the ATS has been written about in detail
before and will not be discussed in this article; rather, more attention will be given to the
framework for determining whether a court can recognize a private claim for a violation of
an international norm under the ATS. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-721 (providing a concise
history of the ATS); Jeremy K. Schrag, Comment, The Tenth Circuit's Misconstructionof
Statutory Rape in International Law Under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 47
WASHBURN L.J. 817, 821-24 (2008); Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the
UnreasonableViews of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 773-80, 776 (2008).
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
22. Id. at 731-33.
23. Id. at 729.
24. Id. at 698.
25. Id. at 698.
26. Id. at 698-99. The original case was brought in 1993, after Alvarez-Machain
received a judgment of acquittal on the charges surrounding his arrest. The procedural
history of the case is lengthy and convoluted and demonstrates the difficulties that the
courts have in effectively dealing with claims asserted under the ATS. Id.
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statute and did not provide a cause of action. 27 Rather, federal common
law provided the cause of action which would allow a plaintiff to sue in
U.S. federal court for a violation of a modest number of international
law norms, and the allegedly unlawful arrest did not fall within that
modest number. 28
In determining what constitutes a violation against the law of
nations for the purposes of jurisdiction under the ATS, the Sosa Court
approved the use of sources found in Article 38(1) of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) statute as evidence of international norms. Article
38(1) examines whether there is a treaty, international norm, or custom
that would provide a cause of action. 29 The Court also found that the
norm needed to be as definite and as accepted among civilized nations
as international law violations with a potential for personal liability
that were in existence at the time the ATS was originally enacted in
1789.30 Although reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
approvingly cited several cases from the Ninth Circuit that created a
framework for ATS determinations. The Ninth Circuit's standard
31
required a norm to be "universal, specific, and obligatory."
As a warning to lower courts to carefully limit private claims under
federal common law, the Sosa majority urged judges to consider the
practical consequences of a private cause of action in U.S. courts under
the ATS.3 2 After implementing the framework set out in the opinion, the
Sosa Court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs arguments, finding his
arrest violated "no norm of customary international law so well defined
as to support the creation of a federal remedy."33 However, the Sosa

27. Id. at 724.
28. Id. at 724, 738.
29. Evidence of an international norm is determined by looking at international
agreements, international custom, the practices of civilized states, and judicial opinions
and commentaries. Id. at 733-34 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
30. At the time the ATS was passed by the First Congress, it is likely that only three
violations had risen to the status of international law: "violations of safe conducts,
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Sosa, 549 U.S. at 724.

31. Id. at 732; see Pauline Abadie, A New Story of David and Goliath: The Alien Tort
Claims Act Gives Victims of Environmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable
Claim Against Multinational Corporations,34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 745, 763-65 (2004)
(discussing the variety of standards that can be used to determine if an international
norm exists).
32. These practical considerations include the following: "whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given [international] norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual," whether all of the remedies have been exhausted in the domestic legal system,
and whether the court should exercise deference as to other political branches. Sosa, 549
U.S. at 732 nn.20, 21.
33. Id. at 738.
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opinion does not foreclose future ATS litigation. Rather, it indicates that
evidence of an international norm sufficient for recognizing private
claims under the ATS regarding a human rights violation must meet
certain standards, potentially foreclosing certain claims from ever being
successfully litigated. 34
II. THE ATS AS A TOOL FOR CHANGE IN CHILD LABOR PRACTICES
Like many U.S. companies, Firestone Natural Rubber Company
(FSNR), the main defendant in the Flomo litigation, is headquartered in
the United States with its production facilities in developing countries.3 5
The global expansion of markets leads to many new cultural and
economic relationships between such U.S. corporations, developing
countries, and these countries' corporations, creating numerous jobs and
benefits.36 However, unequal bargaining power between the businesses
and the individuals with which they contract exacerbates existing
human rights problems. 37 The growth of the international marketplace
has brought greater diversity and tolerance, but this economic growth
often comes at the expense of the most vulnerable: children. 38 Child
workers' access to redress from corporations violating international
norms has the potential to equalize power between workers and their
employers. 39 However, the United States has not yet ratified a treaty
providing a cause of action to child laborers, so any redress in the
United States would have to be found in the U.S. courts, rather than
any international tribunal.
As stated in The Economist, "of all the alleged sins of globalization,
child labour is among the most scorned." 40 While the rationales behind
34. Id. The court noted that the argument that the plaintiffs arrest was a violation of
international law "expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule
having the specificity we require. Creating a private cause of action to further that
aspiration would go beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to
exercise." Id. (footnote omitted).
35. FSNR is the company against which the plaintiffs are seeking damages. Plaintiffs
argue that FSNR is directly liable for Firestone Liberia's child labor practices. Plaintiffs'
Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion on Punitive Damages, supra note
8, at 2 n.2, 9 n.4; Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
36. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does GlobalizationAdvance Human Rights?, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 125, 126-27 (1999) (describing a theory of globalization that developing nations derive
social, economic, and political benefits from globalization).
37. Spencer, supranote 2, at 504.
38. Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, SacrificialLambs of Globalization:Child Labor in
the Twenty-First Century, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 421, 421 (2009).
39. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 2, at 506.
40. Panjabi, supra note 38, at 421 (Sickness or Symptom?, EcoNOMIST, Feb. 5, 2004, at
73).
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protecting children transcend national borders, international regulation
of child labor, as opposed to domestic regulation, must contend with the
"developing world's concern for [its] own economic development."4 ' Thus,
other domestic and international regulations have not failed because the
reasons for prohibiting child labor exist only in the United States, but
rather because regulating child labor in developing countries presents
unique difficulties. These practices persist throughout the world due to
differing conceptions of what constitutes child labor, partial failures of
past agreements to have effective enforcement mechanisms, and specific
obstacles to international regulation in general.
The United States has not yet created a cause of action for child
laborers by way of treaty, in part because of differing conceptions of
childhood. Congress has been reluctant to sign a treaty that is
independently

enforceable

in

U.S.

courts

due

to

uncertainty

surrounding which definition of childhood will be used in litigation.42
However, the ATS allows the courts to examine international law
subject to numerous restrictions, ensuring that U.S. interests, which
include and require examining the various definitions of childhood, are
considered in the analysis.4 3 Thus, the ATS is a unique remedy that
follows general treaty standards and ensures that U.S. interests are
preserved, which is not possible using a treaty by itself as the cause of
action.
Child labor has been addressed on both international and domestic
levels through agreements, treaties, and legislation. 44 However, these
measures differ drastically in how child labor is defined and regulated. 45
These differences can be traced to the competing values and policies
surrounding the conception of childhood, arising from a nation's social,

41. Michele D'Avolio, Child Labor and Cultural Relativism: From 19th Century
America to 21st Century Nepal, 16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 109, 140 (2004).
42. See generally Anna Maria Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy
Analysis of Litigating InternationalHuman Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BUFF. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 139, 153-60 (2006) (explaining how to use treaties in litigation and the
differences between self-executing clauses and non-self executing clauses).

43. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (discussing the various
policies that courts may consider deciding whether a cause of action exists under the

ATS).
44. See generally PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING
IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD (1992) (detailing the international conventions, declarations,
treaties, and domestic states' legislation that have dealt with children's rights since 1918
and the ramifications they have on child labor).

45. See generally William E. Myers, The Right Rights? Child Labor in a Globalizing
World, 575 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 38, 45-53 (2008) (summarizing three
global reference points for national and international policy regarding child labor).
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cultural, and economic circumstances.46 Differing conceptions of the
child can lead to different ideas about a child's ability to work, and can
lead to different assessments of a child's competence and maturity.47 As
a result, what constitutes child labor depends on the definition of
childhood, which itself depends on who defines it. In the United States,
only "oppressive" forms of child labor are illegal.4 8 For example, while a
sixteen-year-old may not work in manufacturing or mining at anytime,4 9
a twelve-year-old may work on a farm outside of school hours with the
consent of his or her parents.50 In Liberia, on the other hand, domestic
statutory law provides that children under sixteen may be employed as
long as their work does not interfere with their education. 51 Despite the
cultural, political, and economic obstacles that lead to such varied
definitions of child labor, international child labor treaties have been
drafted and subsequently ratified by a large part of the global
community, including the United States. 52
Numerous efforts to regulate child labor in the global marketplace
have served as social mobilization tools articulating core labor
standards, but these efforts have largely failed to enforce the standards
they embody.53 The two most prominent child labor agreements of the
International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN's specialized labor
organization, are the Convention No. 138: Concerning the Minimum
Age for Admission to Employment5 4 and Convention No. 182:
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of
the Worst Forms of Child Labour.55 Unfortunately, "some countries

46. Id. at 40-41 (discussing the policy tensions surrounding who gets to decide what
constitutes child labor).
47. DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS & CHILDHOOD 15-41 (2004) (discussing the
differing conceptions of childhood by different theorists through time).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 212(c) (2006).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (2006) (defining oppressive child labor).

50. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(1)(b) (2006).
51. See also 2007 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Liberia, U.S. DEP'T OF
LAB. (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48caa47cl8.html
(citing Labour Practices Law, Title 18 and 18A, sec. 74, 1506, para 11 (Liberia)).
52. See, e.g., Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 6. This
Convention was ratified by the United States on February 12, 1999. Convention No. C182,
ILOLEX: DATABASE OF INT'L LABOUR STANDARDS, http://www.ilo.org/ilolexcgi-lex/ratifce.
pl?C182 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).

53. Frederick B. Jonassen, A Baby-Step to Global Labor Reform: Corporate Codes of
Conduct and the Child, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 7, 13 (2008).
54. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Minimum Age for
Admission to Employment, adopted June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter
Minimum Age Convention].
55. Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 6.
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where child labor is widespread have not signed Convention 138,"56 and
the enforcement mechanism provided for in the Convention has only
been used once, with little effect.5 7 Similarly, the U.N.'s Convention on
the Rights of the Child lacks an enforcement mechanism entirely.58
Agreements generated within the World Trade Organization (WTO)
have been unable to include recognition of workers' rights, and side
agreements under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
have been limited in scope, requiring members to "enforce [only] their
own labor laws," leading to much criticism.59 Though other mechanisms
for regulating child labor have been repeatedly proposed in Congress,
they too have failed in part due to conflict with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which calls for "no prohibition or
60
restrictions" to be placed upon any contracting party by another.
In addition to definitional problems and enforcement failures, there
are specific obstacles to internatioial regulation. First, implementing
child labor standards may actually be worse for the children affected by
these regulations.6 1 Like the United States in the early 20th century,
children often work to support their families. Children working in
substandard conditions may forgo education or even sustenance if they
are prohibited from working. Prohibitions on child labor may further
reduce the overall household income when these children are depended
upon for the aggregated survival of the family unit. Without that extra
income, families may lose their means to survive. Children may also
work to pay for their education. Thus, taking away their jobs may
simultaneously take away their opportunity for any future
advancements. 62 Another pressing concern is that child labor regulation
will not end child labor at all, but will instead force children to work in
more harmful positions, such as being a child prostitute or a child

56. Jonassen, supra note 53, at 15 (citing Ratifications by Convention, ILOLEX:
DATABASE OF INT'L LABOUR STANDARDS, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?cl38
(last visited Sept. 25, 2010); Timothy A. Glut, Changing the Approach to Ending Child
Labor: An InternationalSolution to an InternationalProblem, 28 VAND. J. INT'L L.1203,
1226 n.170 (1995)).

57. Id. at 15 (citing Sarosh C. Kuruvilla & Anil Verma, InternationalLabor Standards,
Soft Regulation, and NationalGovernment Roles, 48 J. INDUS. REL. 41, 45 (2006)).
58. Id. at 16; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 32, adopted
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rights of the Child].
59. Jonassen, supra note 53, at 19 (citing Kuruvilla, supra note 57, at 47 (explaining
the limits of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a division of
NAFTA)).
60. Id. at 20-21 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187).
61. See, e.g., id. at 25-26.
62. Id.
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soldier with employers that are able to evade regulation.63
Second, protectionist policies may raise the cost of labor, depress
labor demand and job prospects, and force workers to "crowd inferior job
markets, depressing wages and working conditions."6 4 Many argue that
developed nations were able to reach industrialized status today
because they were able to use child labor during a critical point in
time.6 5 Child labor regulations would increase the price of exports and
make developing countries less competitive in the global marketplace,
potentially leading to a loss of employment for their citizens. 6 6 Thus,
prohibiting child labor in developing countries may further
disadvantage them economically, leaving them unable to reach an equal
standing with developed nations.67
Lastly, there are problems with the very conception of children's
rights. The right to be free from abusive labor exploitation is not like
other rights, such as freedom of speech or worship. Rather, it is the
right to be prohibited from working even if the child wants to work. 68
Thus, a child's labor right is more of a type of "developmental right,"
implying limitations rather than freedom.69 Because this right silences
children's voices by its very indifference, children must rely upon adults
to advocate for their interests. 70 Children's inability to advocate for
themselves is one of the greatest obstacles to establishing children's
rights. 7'
Many of these arguments raise legitimate reasons not to regulate
child labor. However, at least one treaty, the ILO Convention for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, appears to be
cognizant of developing countries' positions and balances their need to
be competitive in the form of cheap labor in the global marketplace
63. See Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders: III. Legal
Tools for Altering Labor Conditions Abroad, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2202, 2219 n.95 (2005)

(citing William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for
InternationalLabor Standards,80 Neb. L. Rev. 715, 741 (2001)).
64. Pranab Bardhan, Some Up, Some Down, in CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS?
49, 50 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001) (arguing that regulation of labor
standards should consider opportunity costs and side effects on the working poor).
65. Jonassen, supra note 53, at 27 n.146 (citing Timothy A. Glut, Changing the

Approach to Ending Child Labor: An InternationalSolution to an InternationalProblem,
28 VAND. J. INT'L L. 1203, 1208 (1995)).
66. D'Avolio, supra note 41, at 11.

67. Id.
68. Jonassen, supra note 53, at 29.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id.; see Kornikova, supra note 7, at 225 (advocating involving the child in decision-

making about his or her life in contrast to the traditional practice of the child remaining
silent).
71. Jonassen, supra note 53, at 29; Kornikova supranote 7, at 225-26.
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while eliminating the worst forms.7 2 Thus, the scope of the prohibition
on child labor can be narrowed to only certain forms. For instance, it
appears in Flomo that only forced and hazardous forms of child labor
have reached the status of an international norm, so children can still
labor, as long as they are not engaged in the "worst forms." 73 Developing
countries making anti-protectionist arguments are correct in finding
that child labor is good for a nation's economy, but the good is only
short-term. 74 Ultimately, child labor will inhibit socio-economic growth,
creating a cycle of poverty. Because children are paid less than adults,
child labor ultimately displaces adult workers and depresses adult
wages.7 5 The problems surrounding the regulation of child labor should
not be pushed to the side, or no regulatory measure will ever be
effective. However, at the same time, these problems should not prohibit
individual nations, both developed and developing, from trying to find
solutions that work for everyone, especially the children.
III. FLOMO V. FIRESTONENATURAL RUBBER COMPANY: BACKGROUND,
LEGAL ISSUES, AND PRACTICAL REALITIES

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company was the first case in
which a court examined and subsequently found that (1) allegations of
forced and hazardous child labor were sufficient for subject matter
jurisdiction under the ATS, and (2) the allegations, if true, were a
violation of the law of nations.7 6 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that
the child laborers on Firestone Liberia's rubber plantation performed
hazardous labor by "walk[ing] barefoot for up to an hour carrying 150
pounds of latex, balancing two heavy buckets on a stick" three times a
day.77 This task led to "extreme scars and bone and muscle deformities
on their shoulders."7 8 The complaint also alleged that many of the
children developed diseases due to chemical exposure from their jobs
applying pesticides and fertilizers.7 9 Lastly, the complaint alleged that
the children performed forced labor under the theory that Firestone
Liberia's production polices required children to work in order for the

72. Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supranote 6.
73. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
74. Michael D'Avolio, supranote 41, at 26-27.
75. Id. at 116-18.
76. See Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1019-24 (denying defendant's motion for
dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted).
77. Complaint, supra note 11, at para. 47.
78. Id.
79. Id. at paras. 4, 47, 65.
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rubber tappers to meet their quotas.80
Soon after the complaint was filed, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.8 1 The court denied the motion,
finding that plaintiffs' claims of the worst forms of child labor stated a
claim. for relief and could not be dismissed on the pleadings. 82 When
determining if an international norm existed for the purposes of the
defendants' motion, the court examined all of the relevant sources of
international law, as put forth in Sosa.83 The court used the Ninth
Circuit's standard of "universal, specific, and obligatory" norms, but the
opinion did not distinguish this language from the test articulated by
the Supreme Court. 84 The trial court briefly examined the practical
implications of creating a cause of action under the jurisdictional grant
of ATS85 in its supplemental opinion granting summary judgment in
80. Id. at paras. 4, 48,.For specifics of the individual types of hazardous work that the
children performed and how it interfered with their school work, see Plaintiffs' Response
in Opposition to Defendants' Brief and Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment at 2330, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 295) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on Pleadings].
81. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
82. As mentioned before, the ATS is a jurisdictional statute: it does not provide a cause
of action. Thus, the sufficiency of the claim is not relevant to whether the plaintiffs have
established subject-matter jurisdiction. It should be sufficient that plaintiffs allege an
arguable violation of the law of nations. "[T]he absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable)
cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or
constitutional power to hear the case." Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1006, 1022
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Enu't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)) (emphasis in
original).
83. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1008-09.
84. The Bridgestone court does not appear to take the meaning of "universal" literally,
as some commentators have argued the standard may necessitate. Furthermore, the court
treated "specific" and "definite" content the same and seemed not to differentiate between
obligatory and "accepted among civilized nations" or the 18th century paradigm. Thus, at
least in the Bridgestone case, the differences between the language used to describe the
different frameworks seems to be insignificant. Id. at 1022-24.
85. The Supreme Court noted in Sosa that judges should proceed with great caution
when deciding whether to create a new private cause of action under the ATS for violating
international law, and should be wary of legislative and executive roles in managing
foreign affairs. Creating remedies under the ATS can have adverse foreign policy
consequences. Further, since there is no congressional mandate to create new causes of
action under the ATS, the courts must be very careful in light of the fact that several
times the United States Supreme Court has restricted the courts' powers in interpreting
and applying international law. An example of such a restriction is when the Senate
ratifies a treaty, yet ensures that it is not self-executing. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-31.
Additionally, many problems arise in creating a cause of action for child laborers. If
children cannot labor in legitimate" areas, they may be pushed into prostitution or other
illegal forms of labor in order to survive. See William B. Gould IV, Fundamental Rights at
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favor of the defendants.8 6
A. The Flomo Court Correctly Found That an InternationalNorm Exists
as to Plaintiffs' Claims of Child Labor
Although there are no treaties that create a cause of action for
inhumane child labor practices, various international agreements taken
together may evidence an international norm. To determine if an
international norm exists, the court should first examine all of the
current international agreements regarding the alleged violation that
may show evidence of an international norm.8 7 Before examining the
existing international agreements that focus on child labor, the
Supreme Court's application of their own standards in Sosa must be
analyzed for guidance on what evidence will satisfy the Sosa standards
of "definite" and "accepted among civilized nations," standards which
are required before an international norm can be recognized under
federal common law.88 What is considered "definite" and "accepted" is
never explicitly explained in the opinion, so care must be taken to
determine how a court should deal with the specific agreements. Next,
the application of the Sosa framework will be examined.
1. The Supreme Court's Application of the Framework in Sosa
In Sosa, the plaintiff cited two international agreements as evidence
that an international norm against arbitrary arrest existed: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of
which the United States ratified.8 9 The Supreme Court found that
although the cited agreements may have had moral authority, they had
"little utility under the standard set out in this opinion."90 The "little
utility" of these two documents, at least to the Court, arose from

Work and the Law of Nations:An American Lawyer's Perspective, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.

L.J. 1, 40 (2005) (arguing that enforcing international child labor law will be difficult
because of the need for child labor rights to be coupled with financial assistance to Third
World countries to ensure that children do not move into the worst forms child labor);
Kornikova, supra note 7, at 223-25 (discussing whether a child's right to survival should
"trump" a child's right not to labor).
86. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company, No. 06-cv-00627 at 15-18 (S.D. Ind.

Oct. 19, 2010).
87. Sosa, U.S. 542 at 732-34.

88. Id. at 732.
89. Id. at 734.
90.

Id
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deficiencies in the treaties' enforceability. 91 First, "the Declaration 'does
not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international
law."' 92 Second, as the Court noted, while the ICCPR "does bind the
United States as a matter of international law, the United States
ratified [the ICCPR] on the express understanding that it was not selfexecuting and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the
federal courts."93 The plaintiff also noted "findings by a U.N. working
group that [the plaintiffs] detention was arbitrary under the
Declaration, [the ICCPR], and customary international law."94 However,
the court found that the U.N.'s finding alone was not sufficient to raise a
private cause of action and Congress, not the Court, was the appropriate
place to make a request for compensation based on the working group's
finding.9 5 The Court found that both the Declaration and ICCPR did not
"themselves establish the relevant and applicable rule of international
law."96 This implied that the two treaties could be used as evidence of an
international norm, but additional evidence was needed in order to
prove a claim had reached the status of "binding customary
international law."97
2. Application of the Sosa Framework to InternationalChild Labor
Agreements
Because international child labor agreements are often drafted in
broad terms, a norm regarding child labor generally has not yet been
reached.98 However, by applying the Sosa framework, the district court
91. Id. at 734-35.

92. Id.; Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is It
Still Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 289 (2008) (quoting Sosa,
542 U.S. at 734) (discussing the basics of the Declaration, its role in international law, and

nations' obligations under it).
93. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.

94. Id. at 738 n.30.
95. Id.

96. Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
97. Id. (explaining that, in order to discern whether a claim has reached the status of
binding customary law in the absence of a treaty, the Court must resort to "the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators" (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))).
98. See Melissa Torres, Labor Rights and the ATCA Can the ILO's Fundamental
Rights be Supported Through ATCA Litigation?, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 447, 46162 (2004) (discussing the problem of determining whether a prohibition on child labor
covers all child labor or just exploitative forms). Some scholars argue that the idea of labor
regulation originated not at the domestic level, but the international level. E.g.,
Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Labor Standards and Trade Agreements:
U.S. Experience, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 145, 147-48 (1998). Despite this early start at
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in Flomo found that an international norm existed in regard to forced
and hazardous labor,99 in spite of no treaty imposing "of its own force ...
obligations as a matter of international law."0o In large part, this is due
to the plaintiffs' successful strategy, thus far, of consistently arguing
that, regardless of the enforceability of a treaty, a treaty is still evidence
of an international norm.10 1 The district court found that the ILO
Convention 182 was the most convincing agreement that showed
evidence of a standard. However, many international agreements on
child labor were used in the plaintiffs' summary judgment motions. 102
These agreements will be discussed below.

a. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
Although dealing with a broad array of children's human rights
issues, The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) recognizes that
children have the right "to be protected from economic exploitation and
from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous, to interfere
with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development." 03 The CRC
also requires all parties to consider "the best interests of the child."104
The standard is worded so that it is only a primary consideration in the
analysis, not the determining factor. 05 Further, the inherent relative
nature of the word "best" allows a nation to take into account their
cultural, social, and economic views. 06 Though Liberia has ratified the
CRC, the United States has not, which may affect a court's ability to use
the CRC as evidence that an international norm exists. 0 7

the international level, the differences between nations' conceptions of child labor are still
great.
99. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1022 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
100. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734.

101. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, supra
note 80, at 7-9.
102. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
103. Rights of the Child, supra note 54.
104. Id. at art. 3.

105. Id.
106. Kornikova, supranote 7, at 224-25.

107. Database:ChapterVI Human Rights, 11. Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECION, httpY/treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY&
mtdsgono=IV-11&chapter-4&lang-en (last accessed Nov. 4, 2010).
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b. The ILO Convention ConcerningMinimum Age for Admission
to Employment
'The ILO's Minimum Age Convention 138 provided a new framework
for analyzing child labor. The framework allowed for children to engage
in certain work, depending on the stage of economic development of the
country and age of the child. 08 Thus, the standard was variable, but it
also included a recommendation that the minimum age for work that is
likely to jeopardize the health, safety, or morals of young persons be set
at eighteen and that light work may be allowed for a child as young as
thirteen, as long as the work does not harm their education and social
development. 09 The convention's goal was to end all child labor,"10 with
flexibilities built into the agreement to allow developing countries
leeway with their labor policies."' Despite this apparent flexibility,
many developed and developing countries were slow to ratify it, finding
that the guidelines did not always complement their own laws.112
Because of the difficulties with an agreement that has specific
guidelines for nations to follow, neither the United States nor Liberia
has ratified the treaty.118 However, despite the lack of ratifications to
the treaty, the plaintiffs in Flomo used the agreement as evidence of an
international norm, stating that Convention 138 simply recognized an
existing international consensus condemning child labor.114 The U.S.
Department of State affirmed the plaintiffs' assertion, finding that, in
reference to the Convention 138, "an international consensus exists,
based on several key International Labor [sic] Organization (ILO)
Conventions, that certain worker rights constitute core labor
standards," which include freedom from forced and child labor."15
108. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 54, at art. 2-3.
109. Id. at arts. 2(4), 3(1). The ILO is made up of 174 countries and was established in
1919. It was the first specialized agency of the U.N. E.g., Michael J. Dennis, Current

Development: The ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
943, 948 n.1 (1999) (citing NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE,
UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK 211-20 (1998)).
110. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 54, at pmbl., art. 10.
111. See ILO Minimum Age Recommendation (No. 146) art. 10(1), June 26, 1973,
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R146.

112. See Breen Creighton, Combating Child Labour: The Role of InternationalLabour
Standards, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 362, 386-92 (1997) (discussing the specific reasons why
some countries chose not to ratify the convention).
113. ILOLEX Database of Int'l Labour Standards, Ratifications by Country or by
Convention, supranote 52.
114. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, supranote
80, at 7.
115. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1997 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1998), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/globallhuman-rights/1997_hrp-report/overview.html.
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c. The ILO Convention Concerningthe Prohibitionand Immediate
Action for the Eliminationof the Worst Forms of Child Labor
The Flomo court found that The Worst Forms of Child Labor
Convention 182 was the key source of international child labor
standards." 6 The 1999 agreement was created to eliminate the
"unconditional worst forms of child labor" and "hazardous work" by
children.11 7 By its very nature, the treaty draws lines between both the
"worst" forms and other forms of labor for children. The Flomo court
noted the importance of creating categories of worst and other forms of
labor in the agreement and used these distinctions to show that at least
some forms of the labor alleged in the complaint would be prohibited by
the treaty. 18 The court went on to discuss the lack of bright-lines in
child labor and how this treaty articulated the few lines that did
exist.119
Convention 182 has been successful in reaching an international
consensus, with 171 countries ratifying it. However, this consensus
came at a cost; the scope of the agreement is much narrower than
Convention 138.120 The United States ratified the treaty with the
understanding that it was not self-executing and would not be
enforceable as a matter of U.S. law in U.S. courts.121 Liberia also
ratified Convention 182.122 Article 3d of Convention 182 states that
forms of labor that are considered the "worst" are those that harm "the
health, safety, or morals of children." 123 Article 4 provides that whether
work falls under Article 3d (that which is considered the "worst" forms)
"shall be determined

by national

law or regulations

. . . after

consultation with the organizations of employers and workers
concerned."124 Thus, Convention 182 places the duty to regulate child
labor on states, with member states submitting annual reports on how
116. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
117. Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supra note 6.
118. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22.
119. Id. at 1022.
120. See generally Dennis, supra note 109 (discussing the negotiations surrounding
Convention 182 and what is meant by the terms hazardous work and education in the
agreement).
121. See International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, Report of
the Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards to the President's
Committee on the International Labor Organization Regarding Convention No. 182 On
the Worst Forms of Child Labor, adopted July 28, 1999, 1999 WL 33292717.
122. Liberia, ILOLEX: DATABASE OF INT'L LABOUR STANDARDS, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?Liberia (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
123. Convention on Worst Forms of Child Labour, supranote 6.
124. Id. at art. 4.
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they are implementing the conventions. 125
Though each of these agreements individually might not provide
enough evidence of an international norm to allow for jurisdiction of a
private cause of action under Sosa, the widespread signing and
ratification of the three agreements together might. All three of the
conventions prohibit at least some forms of child labor, and all prohibit
"forced and hazardous" labor, such as the plaintiffs allege in their
complaint. Despite the cultural, social, and political difficulties in
determining exactly what child labor practices should be allowed on an
international level, on a domestic level, a U.S. court following the
standards articulated in Sosa can examine evidence of a prohibition on
"forced and hazardous" child labor based on international norms, and
this is precisely what the court did in Flomo. Thus, the forces of
globalization may be able to have more of an impact on child labor
practices through domestic courts, at least in the United States, than
through international agreements by themselves.

B. The Constraintsof ATS Child Labor Litigation
After the Flomo court found that the plaintiffs' child labor claims
had passed the jurisdictional bar of Sosa and properly alleged a
violation of an international norm, the plaintiffs began discovery. As one
of the Flomo plaintiffs' attorneys noted in an interview, the Flomo
litigation was "very complex in terms of the amount of documents, the
amount of witnesses, [and] the number of expert witnesses" when
compared to other forms of employment litigation. 126 Overall, ATS
litigation "takes longer and is more expensive"; it is "employment law on
a global scale." 127 For example, because the attorneys are so distant
from their clients, even with local counsel in Liberia, it can take a

125. International Labour Organization Constitution art. 22, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat.
2712, 15 U.N.T.S. 35. Nations or individuals may file complaints with the ILO if they are
dissatisfied with a nation's compliance with the convention. A nation may refer the
complaint to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a binding determination on
whether a nation's laws are sufficient under a treaty. Id. at arts. 24-31.
126. The plaintiffs' attorney that was interviewed has been to Liberia four times in
relation to the case, each time staying for multiple weeks. Email Interview with Kimberly
Jeselskis, Attorney, Jeselskis Law Office (July 27, 2010).
127. As the litigation was on a global scale, various global actors were involved. At least
one NGO provided support, and the plaintiffs relied on such documents as the Save My
Future Foundation (SAMFU) report and U.N. reports. The Liberian government did not
assist the Plaintiffs in their litigation efforts at all, as its relationship with Firestone is
very sensitive. Further, there was surprisingly little media involvement other than the
initial media attention when the case was first filed. Id.
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substantial amount of time to coordinate something as simple as having
128
a witness sign a declaration.
Use of the ATS as a governance tool is not without repercussions.
Various arguments made in the Flomo case indicate that the plaintiffs
and their attorneys are not always certain that the consequences of the
suit are worth it. In addition to being limited by the logistical realities
of litigating claims from a developing state such as Liberia, the
plaintiffs in Flomo and their attorneys had to be vigilant in protecting
witnesses for their case and in ensuring the continued employment of
the plaintiffs' guardians. Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs'
guardians' continued employment on the plantation was in jeopardy.
The plaintiffs' attorneys acted as funambulists in crafting their
arguments to lessen the risk to the plaintiffs' and their guardians.
Though they sought to end the "worst forms of child labor," that very
labor continued to be available to the adults on the plantation. 129 Only
30
fifteen percent of all Liberians are employed in the formal sector,1 and
work as a tapper on the Firestone plantation is often the only means of
survival.131 Firestone Liberia also provides schooling, housing, health
services for its employers and their families, and services that may be
128. Id.
129. Another issue was whether the plaintiffs should be allowed an interpreter. After a
particularly long deposition of one of the child plaintiffs, in which the plaintiff stated that
she did not understand the question 112 times, plaintiffs' counsel filed a protective order
for use of an interpreter for future depositions. Transcript of Telephone Conference at 910, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 125). An interpreter is warranted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1827(d) when a party "speaks only or primarily a language other than the English
language ... so as to inhibit such party's comprehension." The dispute that arose between
the parties was whether Liberian English was different from American English. The
plaintiffs presented declarations from multiple experts stating that Liberian English was
a distinct language. Defendants argued that any misunderstandings that occurred
between Liberian English and American English could be resolved without the aid of a
translator. After a telephone hearing, the court granted plaintiffs motion to use
interpreters in future depositions. Transcript of Telephone Conference, supra,at 5-32. See
generally Plaintiffs' Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion For a Protective Order
to Require Defendants to Conduct the Depositions of Plaintiffs and Their Third-Party
Liberian Witnesses with Interpreters, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 109) (arguing that
Liberian English differs from American English, and explaining arguments why plaintiffs
need a protective order). In future labor cases, whether an interpreter is needed should be
considered, even in the case where a non-American form of English is used.
130. Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Liberia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/6618.htm.
131. See UNITED NATIONS LIBERIA, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
FRAMEWORK LIBERIA 2008-2012: CONSOLIDATING PEACE AND NATIONAL RECOVERY FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11, 16 (2008), available at http://unliberia.org/doclundaf
doc.pdf (noting that fifty-one percent of all Liberians are food insecure or are highly
vulnerable to food insecurity and that only forty-one percent of all Liberians have any
health coverage).
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unattainable outside of the plantation. 132 Because the plaintiffs were
extraterritorially located, laws that protect individuals from retribution
for either bringing suit over labor violations or testifying in such a suit
do not always apply, though some do exist.133 The steps taken to
preserve the employment of adults involved in the Flomo case is
discussed below, as well as the problems that inevitably arise when
trying to protect the employment of adults involved in the very labor
that the plaintiffs are simultaneously arguing against.
1. Preservationof Plaintiffs' GuardiansEmployment by Protecting
Their Identities
When first filing the complaint, the plaintiffs used pseudonyms to
protect the children's identities. This was necessary, according to the
plaintiffs, "due to fear of retaliation against themselves and their
families by persons who are employees and/or agents of the
Defendants." 134 The complaint noted there would be:
significant pressure on local Firestone employees and
managers to identify and silence the Plaintiffs for daring
to speak out about the generations of suffering that have
gone on at the Firestone Plantation.

. .

. [Additionally,]

the Plaintiffs, if identified by name, would face
termination, and they would be kicked out of their
Firestone-provided shack, leaving them homeless and
destitute. They would have no legal recourse in Liberia
for this retaliation. 135

132. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA'S RUBBER
PLANTATIONS: TAPPING INTO THE FUTURE 28, 39-41, 44, 51 (May 2006), available at

for
Plaintiffs'
Motion
http://unmil.org/documents/humanrightsliberiarubber.pdfProtective Order and, or in the Alternative, Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2-3,
Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 246) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order]
(arguing that terminating plaintiffs' guardians "will not only take away the paltry wage
that they are earning, but will effectively put them out on the streets as their
terminations will prompt Firestone to evict them from their company housing").
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2010) (prohibiting any person from intimidating, threatening,
or corruptly persuading another person with the intent to cause that person to "withhold
testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding," §
1512(b)(2)(A), and providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction, § 1512(h)); 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(permitting courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages or principles of law").
134. Complaint, supra note 11, at para. 8.
135. Id.
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However, as the litigation proceeded and the plaintiffs were
deposed, the plaintiffs' names slowly became known to the defendants,
and, in April 2009, their full names were revealed by court order.13 6
The plaintiffs also took steps to protect any witnesses who were
assisting them with their case by discussing what they knew about the
child labor policies on the plantation. Soon after the suit was filed,
Firestone Liberia implemented a "zero-tolerance policy" against
employees involving children in their work and stated that anyone who
violated it would "risk losing their job."137 In order for the plaintiffs to
discover whether child labor was continuing despite the policy, they
needed to ask witnesses about the practices. However, Firestone
threatened to fire the children's guardians if the children testified that
they were working.138 The plaintiffs were also concerned about selective
enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy against those individuals that
helped plaintiffs with their case. 39
In order to deal with this concern, the plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction ensuring that Firestone Liberia could not
retaliate against the plaintiffs' witnesses that testified about whether
children were currently working or had worked on the Liberian
plantation.140 The court did not grant the injunction, but did prevent the
defendants from receiving the plaintiffs responses to interrogatories by
sealing the responses until after the court ruled on the motion for
summary judgment.141 The court later reconsidered its motion and
ordered the interrogatory responses to be unsealed.142 At that time, the
court noted its concern "that continuing to allow [the] Plaintiffs to avoid
complying with their discovery obligations perpetuates the very
practices [the] Plaintiffs contend to be illegal and universally
136. Order, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 194); Notice of Caption Change, supra note 8.
137. About Firestone Liberia, BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS, INC., http://www.bridgestonefirestone.com/aboutbgindex.asp?id=about/fsbg (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (discussing
briefly the zero-tolerance policy on child labor). The effectiveness of the recently
implemented zero-tolerance policy was in dispute: Plaintiffs stated that Firestone only
made "superficial cosmetic attempts to enforce a prohibition of child labor at times of key
significance in this case.... [H]eadmen, overseers, and superintendents tell the children
to hide when they see cars coming and then to resume their normal work." The rest of the
time "business as usual continued" with "children performing hazardous work with
Firestone's knowledge and encouragement." See Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order,
supra note 129, at 3.
138. Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order, supranote 129, at 3.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 1.
141. Entry on Motion for Protective Order and, or in the Alternative, Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 6, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 352) [hereinafter Entry on
Motion for Protective Order].
142. Order at 4-6, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627 (No. 569).
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condemned 'worst forms' of child labor."143
The court's concern was logically valid. The plaintiffs, in effect,
wanted to ensure that the "worst forms of child labor" were no longer
occurring on the Firestone Plantation, but did not want the "zerotolerance" policy against child labor to be enforced against them and
their guardians. In deciding not to grant the preliminary injunction, the
court aptly stated:
that regardless of the Defendants' motives, enforcing the
policy as to the Plaintiffs, even if that enforcement is
selective, will achieve what is ostensibly the core goal of
this litigation-protecting the Plaintiffs from the dangers
of the worst forms of child labor. . . . The Court
recognizes that . . . it will also likely subject the

Plaintiffs to dangers of another sort-the very real peril
of being homeless and destitute in Liberia. Perhaps
performing child labor is the lesser of two evils, perhaps
it is not; that is a decision for the individual Plaintiffs to
make.144

The plaintiffs, in continuing the ATS child labor litigation, had to
determine the lesser of the two evils and understand how being a
plaintiff in such a case could affect their very ability to survive.
2. The Limits of Relief Under the ATS
In their claims for injunctive relief, plaintiffs did not just ask for the
"worst forms of child labor" to cease on the Liberian rubber plantation,
but also requested a "reduction in task sizes attendant duties associated
with tapping so one adult person can complete the daily production
quotas without the assistance of children or additional adults."145 This
form of relief was requested to ensure that the adult laborers would no
longer need to use child labor to complete their tasks. The court denied

143. Id. at 5-6.
144. Entry on Motion for Protective Order, supranote 141, at 5.
145. Exhibit A to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claim for
Injunctive Relief and to Strike the Prayer for Injunctive Relief at 4, Flomo, No. 06-cv00627 (No. 490-1) (citing from Plaintiffs Statement of Damages). Though the plaintiffs
originally sought injunctive relief, the plaintiffs decided not to oppose the defendants'
summary judgment motion to rule on claims of injunctive relief. The court granted the
defendants' summary judgment motion as to injunctive relief. Thus, the plaintiffs now are
suing solely for compensatory and punitive damages. Order at 1, Flomo, No. 06-cv-00627
(No. 566).
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the injunction and noted, "it does not appear . .. that it has the power to
give the Plaintiffs the remedy they really want: a reduction of quotas to
eliminate the alleged need for parents to enlist their children to help
them." 146 Though the ATS can be a tool to eliminate the "worst forms of
child labor," it "does not provide a warrant to oversee labor practices all
over the world, and it does not mean that the court must open its doors
to address the plights of thousands of people who will never come
anywhere near the United States."147 Liberia remains very different
than the United States and, as discussed above, child labor may be the
only way for children on rubber plantations to survive. Thus, future
parties must carefully consider the consequences in bringing suit for
violations of international norms and whether the risk they are
undertaking is worth the changes an ATS suit may bring.
CONCLUSION

As the global marketplace continues to expand, multinational
corporations continue to seek the cheapest form of labor to remain
competitive. The ATS, however, provides a limited regulatory tool for
ensuring that corporations do not engage in the "worst forms of child
labor." In this way, U.S. courts are able to influence global labor
practices. This may slowly pressure multinational corporations and, in
turn, nation-states to change their labor practices to ensure they do not
violate international norms, influencing the practices of the global
marketplace through domestic measures (i.e. from the bottom-up). Since
the Supreme Court's ruling in Sosa, the lower courts have affirmation
that using the ATS as a means of redress for violations of international
norms is proper, as long as the courts proceed with caution.
Based on the relevant international agreements, the Flomo
plaintiffs' claim that the "worst forms of child labor" constitute a
violation of international norms is sufficient for recognition under the
ATS and the law of nations. Yet, future plaintiffs must be diligent to
ensure that the employment of parties not engaged in the "worst forms
of child labor" is maintained, which may lead to difficulties throughout
the litigation. In the end, though judgment was rendered in favor of
defendants, it is important to remember the children and ensure that
they are not exploited by, at the very least, U.S. corporations. The
repercussions of allowing children to perform forced and hazardous
labor will not only limit their future, but will negatively affect the core
infrastructures of developing countries.
146. Entry on Motion for Protective Order, supra note 141, at 4.
147. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 257 F.R.D. 159, 173 (S.D. Ind. 2009).

I

